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1 Introduction 
Despite the proliferation of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs), there has been 
limited interest in researching how the positions of parties (and/or candidates) 
are estimated in VAAs. This is quite surprising, considering that there are many 
competing methods for doing so (Laver 2001; Volkens 2007) and that the quest 
for identifying the most appropriate one in terms of validity and reliability has 
sparked extensive debates in political science. With some notable exceptions (see 
Gemenis 2013; Krouwel and van Elfrinkhof 2013), this debate has not permeated 
the VAA research community. This is unfortunate for two reasons. First of all, 
VAAs have potential consequences for voting behaviour (Ladner et al. 2012; 
Walgrave et al. 2008; Wall et al. 2012), and hence considering the reliability and 
validity of party position estimates used in VAAs is of vital importance to 
evaluate their quality as voter information tools. Secondly, VAAs generate a 
wealth of party position estimates on a variety of policy issues that could be 
potentially useful in answering questions of interest to political science outside 
the domain of VAAs (Gemenis 2013; Hansen and Rasmussen 2013; Krouwel 
2012; Wagner and Ruusuvirta 2012; Wheatley et al. 2012).  
 
With this paper we aim to contribute to the emerging debate by performing a 
direct comparison of four popular methods used to estimate party positions in 
VAAs. Specifically, we compare party self-placement, the conventional expert 
survey, the iterative method between party self-placement and expert coding 
proposed by Kieskompas, and the Delphi method as applied to the use of experts. 
Using data from the 2012 Dutch parliamentary election, we compare the 
competing methods in terms of their ease of use, the degree to which they 
provide estimates that have face validity, and where appropriate, in terms of 
inter-coder agreement. Our conclusions have implications for both VAA 
designers and third-party users of VAA party position data. 
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2 An overview of the methods compared 
2.1 Party self-placement 
Without a doubt, the most obvious thing to do if one wants to estimate the 
position of a particular party is to ask the party itself. This is what StemWijzer 
(The Netherlands), VoteMatch (UK), and Wahl-O-Mat (Germany) do, along with 
many other candidate-based VAAs such as Smartvote (Switzerland), Vaalikone 
(Finland), Manobalsas (Lithuania) and the VAAs designed by Danish 
newspapers and internet media. In its simplest form, this method consists of 
sending a questionnaire to each party (or its candidates) asking them to place 
themselves on a number of statements and provide a brief justification of its 
placement. Despite its intuitive appeal, this method has been proven difficult to 
replicate in many electoral settings. This is because, while political parties are 
often willing to reveal their positions on issues that they ‘own’, they are less 
likely to reveal their positions on controversial issues which they consider to be 
non-salient or electorally damaging. Parties have long been resisting attempts by 
political scientists to survey the attitudes of their cadres and MPs, and continue 
to do so when confronted with questionnaires sent by VAA designers. It is 
therefore telling that only 103 out of the 274 (37.6%) parties in the EU Profiler 
agreed to provide their placements on the 30 issues statements provided by the 
VAA designers (Trechsel and Mair 2011: 15).  
 
Since VAA designers who adopt this method do not necessarily verify, let alone 
challenge, the positions and justifications provided by parties, we should also 
consider the possibility that parties may provide strategic responses intended to 
manipulate the direction of advice given to VAA users. Indeed there are several 
instances where parties attempted to manipulate the process of self-placement in 
order to place themselves in positions that are perceived to be more popular 
among voters (see Krouwel et al. 2012: 233; Ramonaitė 2010: 134-137; Wagner 
and Ruusuvirta 2012: 406). Most often, centrist positions are more popular as 
VAA users tend to cluster in the middle of distributions in scales consisting of 
multiple items (as in the case of the two-dimensional political space of 
Kieskompas and the VAAs in this family), or in the middle of response scales in 
questions which have been framed so as to present a dilemma between two 
different policies (Baka et al. 2012). 
2.2 Conventional expert surveys 
Ever since Castles and Mair (1984) popularised this method in political science, 
expert surveys have been regularly used to estimate parties’ positions, including 
VAAs such as Pick-Your-Party (Ireland), HelpMeVote (Greece), and Votematch 
(Italy). In its simplest form, an expert survey consists of a questionnaire sent to 
political scientists asking them to place certain political parties using the 
provided scales. Conventional expert surveys do not ask experts to justify the 
given placements. It is assumed that their expertise is enough to produce valid 
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estimates. Budge (2000) argued that expert surveys are problematic inasmuch 
different experts might evaluate different aspects of the party, may use different 
criteria, and different time frames. Steenbergen and Marks (2007) countered this 
by arguing that errors emanating from such problems tend to ‘cancel each other 
out’. This cancelling out, however, may not necessarily lead to better estimates. 
As Tilley and Wlezien (2008) have shown, the ‘cancelling’ of errors by simple 
mathematical aggregation via some measure of central tendency (mean/median) 
may lead to implausible party placements near the centre of the scales. Experts 
are not as sophisticated as expert survey designers usually assume, and should 
not necessarily know how to place small parties on very specific statements such 
as the ones typically asked in VAAs. Instead of mathematical aggregation one 
needs to select and use the responses of the most sophisticated experts for each 
question posed in the expert survey, something that is impossible to do in 
conventional expert surveys since we have no means to evaluate experts’ 
expertise.  
 
Even though we cannot evaluate their expertise we know that experts estimate 
party positions with much uncertainty, as evident by their disagreement. 
Steenbergen and Marks (2007: 353-355) and Hooghe et al. (2010: 693) showed 
that expert disagreement seems to be a function of party differentiation, issue 
salience, internal dissent, party size, and party extremism. Experts are least in 
agreement when placing smaller parties on very specific issues, especially if the 
parties in question are not ‘owners’ of the issues. These findings imply that 
experts’ estimates are reliable in some cases but not in others. Unfortunately, the 
latter are exactly the cases VAAs often attempt to estimate: very specific issue 
positions for very small parties. This is why VAAs often use expert surveys 
intended to capture party positions on more general policy scales (environment, 
social policy, immigration) than the more specific questions used by the same 
VAAs to capture voter preferences (Wall et al. 2009). If such general scales are 
used at the party level, it follows that similar scales need to be used to measure 
users’ preferences since the general logic of VAAs is to match voters to parties 
by using common questions and scales. Asking users to self-place on such 
general scales, however, might compromise the measurement of their attitudes as 
the perception of their content varies considerably among respondents (Evans et 
al. 1996).  
 
Finally, we should note that expert survey estimates of party positions might be 
biased since a considerable majority of political scientists are known to be leftist 
or liberal in their own preferences (Mariani and Hewitt 2008). Curini (2010) 
investigated this hypothesis and found that experts who are unsympathetic 
towards extreme right and conservative parties would sometimes place such 
parties (statistically) significantly more to the right compared to experts that are 
indifferent in terms of sympathy. Therefore, the switch from party self-placement 
to an expert survey does not necessarily imply an absence of bias. The parties’ 
strategic manipulation of self-placement may be replaced by implicit bias 
coming from political scientists own partisan sympathies and levels of expertise. 
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2.3 The Kieskompas method 
The pitfalls of party self-placement and expert survey methods have prompted 
VAA designers to opt for a hybrid method (Krouwel et al. 2012). This hybrid 
method has been used by Kieskompas (The Netherlands), and its variants, like La 
Boussole Présidentielle (France), Aftonbladets Valkompass (Sweden), Bússola 
Eleitoral (Portugal), as well as the EU Profiler. This method can be best 
described as iteration between party self-placement, and party placement by a 
small team of experts. The VAA questionnaire is sent to parties that are asked to 
position themselves on the given statements and provide some factual evidence 
of their placement, while a small team works concurrently but independently to 
place parties based on their manifestos and public statements. The two 
placements are compared to one another and, in cases of disagreement, parties 
are asked to reconsider their initial placement. After several rounds of iteration 
between the team and the parties, the percentage of statements in which parties 
and the coding team agree with regard to the placement, rises from 70-80% to 
around 95% (Krouwel and van Elfrinkhof 2013: 14). In the remaining statements 
where disagreement between parties and the team persists, despite the iteration 
over several rounds, the team makes the final decision about how party positions 
should be coded. 
 
Krouwel and van Elfrinkhof (2013) argue that the Kieskompas method is an 
improvement over previously used methods such as party self-placement and 
expert surveys, as it combines their strengths in order to counter their 
weaknesses. The positions provided by parties aim to help the team (of experts) 
in cases where policy positions are not clearly stated in the publicly available 
documents, while the positions provided by the team aim to counter-balance the 
possibility of strategic manipulation by parties. The development of this hybrid 
method has been a particularly welcome development in the VAA literature, but 
it is not entirely unproblematic. For one, the Kieskompas method still requires 
the cooperation of parties. As already noted, however, the majority of parties in 
Europe are not willing to respond to questionnaires, and some even turn hostile 
when they realize that the placements they provided can be challenged by VAA 
designers (see Trechsel and Mair 2011: 13-15). Without the full and unfettered 
cooperation of political parties the Kieskompas method cannot work as originally 
intended.  
 
Secondly, while it has been shown that the iteration between parties and teams of 
experts leads to a consensus position for the vast majority of the cases, we know 
little if anything about how the team reaches consensus for their own part of the 
estimation process. The Kieskompas method tries to ensure that the members of 
the team will be on the same ‘page’ and minimize inter-coder disagreement, by 
establishing a ‘hierarchy of (document) sources’ (Krouwel et al. 2012: 227-228). 
Yet disagreements can emerge as coders might be using the same piece of 
information but interpret or weight it differently (Bolger and Wright 1992: 61-
63). Gemenis (2013: 278-279), for instance, found extensive disagreement 
among student coders when they were asked to code parties on selected EU 
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Profiler statements using their Euromanifestos as the sole piece of information. 
Trechsel and Mair (2011: 13) mention that such inter-coder disagreements were 
resolved through discussions among team members and the team leader. This 
implies that consensus in the team was reached through a process which can be 
characterized as ‘unstructured behavioural aggregation’ (Ferrell 1985: 135). 
Nevertheless, methodologists often advise against the use of such discussions as 
a mean to achieve consensus (Armstrong 2006), as such processes are known to 
be affected by the personalities and prestige of those involved in the discussion 
(Ferrell 1985: 136; Krippendorff 2004: 217). 
2.4 The Delphi method 
The problems with inter-expert/coder agreement in conventional expert surveys 
and the Kieskompas method have prompted VAA researchers to use an 
alternative method of eliciting and aggregating expert opinion (Gemenis 2012a). 
This approach uses the so-called Delphi method originally developed to forecast 
technological change (Dalkey and Helmer 1963). This Delphi method has been 
used to estimate parties’ and candidates’ positions in VAAs developed by the 
‘Preference Matcher’ consortium starting with Choose4Greece (Greece), and 
continuing with Xmamkvlevi (Georgia), VotulMeu (Romania), and 
Choose4Cyprus (Cyprus).2 The Delphi method is an interactive forecasting 
technique that relies on the judgmental input of a panel of experts through a 
process of ‘structured behavioural aggregation’ (Ferrell 1985: 140) characterized 
by anonymity and controlled feedback. In its simplest form, a ‘moderator’ selects 
a panel of experts who work independently of each other and asks them to 
provide estimates on parties’ policy positions, and justify them by providing a 
piece of information. Subsequently, the moderator collects the individual 
estimates and associated pieces of information and feeds them anonymously 
back to the panel for a new round of estimation. The panelists are then asked to 
update their initial estimates based on the new information. Once sufficient 
consensus is reached, the responses are aggregated mathematically (by taking a 
measure of central tendency) for establishing final estimates.  
 
A considerable body of evidence (for a comprehensive meta analysis, see Rowe 
and Wright 1999) has shown that the Delphi method gives more accurate 
estimates compared to mere mathematical aggregation via conventional expert 
surveys or unstructured behavioural aggregation via unstructured group 
discussions. Anonymity plays a crucial role as it guarantees that consensus is 
reached due to the quality of information associated with the estimates and is not 
affected by the personalities (and biases) of individual panelists.3 The mechanism 
is simple: knowledgeable panelists will stick to their original estimates, whereas 
those with little information will revise their estimates towards the group average 
                                                          
2 The consortium website can be accessed at: http://www.preferencematcher.org. 
3 Of course, it is possible for personalities to become manifest in the estimation via the provided 
justifications. We contend that this does not pose a serious challenge to the method, as anonymity 
allows panelists to focus on the usefulness of the information provided and disregard any possible 
personality effects. 
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(Parenté and Anderson-Parenté 1987). Gemenis (2012a) argues that the Delphi 
method performed well in eliciting consensus among panelists in 
Choose4Greece, including many ‘difficult’ cases, after two rounds of iteration. 
An additional advantage of using the Delphi method is that VAA designers need 
not rely on the cooperation of political parties, although party self-placement 
may be solicited and incorporated in the estimation process as an additional piece 
of feedback information between rounds. The main disadvantage of this method 
regards its cost. As the panel of experts cannot consist in its entirety of the VAA 
design team members, external expertise must be solicited. Panelists need to be 
remunerated for their involvement in the estimation process since the Delphi 
method is considerably cognitively and time-taxing compared to a conventional 
expert survey. 
3 Data 
In order to conduct a fair ‘shoot-out’ among the four methods we sought to 
compare their efficiency using a common set of VAA statements. For practical 
reasons, we drew six statements from the 2012 Dutch parliamentary election 
Kieskompas as we would be unable to replicate the exact process of estimation 
(discussions within the Kieskompas team and iteration with political parties) 
should we have chosen statements from another VAA. Our choice of statements 
(see Table X.2) attempted to reflect the typical differences in policy areas, 
complexity, and framing strategies found in VAAs.4 For all statements the 
response was a 5-point scale ranging from ‘completely disagree’ (1) to 
‘completely agree’ (5) with a ‘no response’ option.5 Choosing the Netherlands as 
the country for comparison ensured the fairness of the shoot-out as the country is 
known for having high response rates in both conventional expert surveys and 
requests for party self-placement. For practical reasons associated with time 
constrains and cost, we chose to survey the eight largest parties from the eleven 
that are currently represented in Tweede Kamer.6 
 
The party self-placement data were kindly provided by André Krouwel and 
consist of the initial party responses to the request for self-placement made by 
Kieskompas. For the expert survey data we conducted a conventional expert 
survey by contacting 42 Dutch political scientists specializing in party politics 
and electoral research through the on-line Lime Survey platform. In addition to 
                                                          
4 The original wording of the statements is: (1) Het belastingtarief voor de hoogste inkomens moet 
omhoog; (2) De overheid moet meer ingrijpen in de economie; (3) Ambtenaren van de burgerlijke 
stand mogen weigeren homostellen te trouwen; (4) Alle volwassenen zijn automatisch orgaandonor, 
tenzij zij expliciet hebben aangegeven dat niet te willen; (5) Nederland moet in de euro blijven; (6) 
Het dragen van een boerka moet worden verboden.  
5 Original wording: (1) Helemaal niet mee eens; (2) Niet mee eens; (3) Neutraal; (4) Mee eens; (5) 
Helemaal mee eens; (missing value) Geen mening. 
6 It would have been interesting to see how the methods would perform in the estimation of smaller 
parties’ positions, which is generally considered to be more difficult. Our choice of issues and parties 
combined, however, presents enough variation to allow us to make comparisons across different 
levels of estimation difficulty. 
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placing the eight parties on the six statements, we asked experts to place the 
same parties on a 10-point left-right scale.7 To gauge experts’ sympathy towards 
the parties, we asked them to indicate the degree to which each parties’ policies 
corresponded to their own, using 10-point scales.8 We received 25 valid 
responses (59.2% response rate), more than those received by the Chapel Hill 
team (Bakker et al. 2012) and Benoit and Laver (2006) expert surveys. For the 
Kieskompas method data, we extracted the final estimates from the 2012 Dutch 
parliamentary election Kieskompas website. Finally, for the Delphi method data 
we solicited the help of a panel of 14 experts. Since the Delphi method has been 
designed for use with disparate experts, our panel included four faculty members 
holding a doctorate, four PhD researchers, and six master’s students. The 
panelists were assigned through a block haphazard procedure to estimate the 
positions of four parties each, so as to have seven panelists for each party (see 
Appendix). Estimation took place over two rounds with controlled feedback 
from one round to another through the use of J. Scott Armstrong’s on-line Delphi 
platform. The panelists received instructions regarding the Delphi method and 
the on-line platform. More specifically, they were asked to refer to the 2012 
election manifestos of the parties as much as possible when they were justifying 
their estimates, although they were also told that they could use other pieces of 
information or provide a personal justification in case the election manifesto was 
not helpful enough. After the second round of estimation, the panelists were 
remunerated for their participation. 
4 Analysis 
We begin the analysis with an evaluation of agreement among experts/coders. 
Since the party self-placement method provides only a single estimate, and since 
we were unable to fully replicate the unstructured group discussions in a way 
that would be fair to the Kieskompas method, we limit our examination of inter-
expert/coder agreement to the expert survey and Delphi methods. To measure 
agreement, we use van der Eijk’s (2001) coefficient A. As van der Eijk (2001: 
328) demonstrated, in ordinal rating scales such as the 5, 7 and 10-point response 
scales used in VAAs and expert surveys, the standard deviation (which is 
typically used to evaluate expert surveys, e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006: 162-164; 
Steenbergen and Marks 2007: 353-355; Hooghe et al. 2010: 693) is inappropriate 
as measure of agreement or consensus because it reflects the skewedness of a 
distribution in addition to dispersion. Conversely, coefficient A mitigates this 
problem as it conceptualizes agreement as a function of dispersion and deviation 
from unimodality. Table X.1 presents the A coefficients for each of the six 
statements. As can be seen from the figures in the table, agreement among the 
experts is quite high for both the expert survey and the Delphi method 
estimation.  
                                                          
7 Original question wording: ‘Plaatst u alstublieft alle partijen op een algemene links-rechts dimensie. 
Neem daarbij zoveel mogelijk beleidsposities van de partij in overweging.’ 
8 Original question wording: ‘Als u alle aspecten van het partijbeleid in overweging neemt, geef dan 
alstublieft voor iedere partij aan hoe dicht deze bij uw eigen opvattingen staat.’ 
Table X.1: Perceptual agreement among experts 
 PvdA VVD CDA PVV CU D66 GL SP Mean 
 Round Round Round Round Round Round Round Round Round 
Statement 1st  2nd 1st  2nd 1st  2nd 1st  2nd 1st  2nd 1st  2nd 1st  2nd 1st  2nd 1st  2nd 
1. Taxes 0.93 1 1 1 0.4 0.79 0.55 0.86 0.22 0.71 0.55 0.48 1 1 1 1 0.71 0.86 
2. State/economy 0.86 1 0.86 1 0.71 0.93 0.71 0.93 0.55 0.86 0.57 0.71 0.38 0.93 1 1 0.71 0.92 
3. Gay couples 1 1 0.93 1 0.86 0.79 0.93 1 1 1 1 1 0.93 1 0.45 1 0.89 0.97 
4. Organ donors 0.53 1 0.93 1 0.31 0.57 0.79 0.79 0.86 1 0.86 0.93 0.93 1 0.92 1 0.77 0.91 
5. Euro 1 1 0.93 0.93 1 1 1 1 0.64 0.79 1 1 0.86 1 0.75 0.86 0.9 0.95 
6. Burqa 0.75 0.79 0.93 1 0.63 0.7 1 1 0.29 0.86 0.83 1 0.86 0.93 0.42 0.79 0.71 0.88 
Mean 0.85 0.97 0.93 0.99 0.65 0.80 0.83 0.93 0.59 0.87 0.80 0.85 0.83 0.98 0.76 0.94 0.78 0.92 
1. Taxes 0.84  0.98  0.76  0.48  0.73  0.66  0.86  1  0.79  
2. State/economy 0.86  0.92  0.82  0.5  0.52  0.66  0.78  0.96  0.75  
3. Gay couples 0.79  0.68  0.68  0.65  0.92  0.98  0.94  0.54  0.77  
4. Organ donors 0.71  0.48  0.82  0.63  0.89  0.93  0.75  0.44  0.71  
5. Euro 0.86  0.8  0.76  0.85  0.6  0.96  0.82  0.52  0.77  
6. Burqa 0.73  0.51  0.61  0.98  0.68  0.72  0.72  0.5  0.68  
Mean 0.8  0.73  0.74  0.68  0.72  0.82  0.81  0.66  0.75  
Left-right 0.79  0.74  0.79  0.53  0.73  0.86  0.75  0.72  0.72  
The level of perceptual agreement in the first Delphi round is similar to that of 
the expert survey, although the figures are higher in the Delphi in four out of six 
statements. The comparison to the second Delphi round, however, is 
unequivocal. The anonymous iteration with feedback of the Delphi method leads 
to an even higher agreement among the panelists, higher than any figure 
observed in the expert survey. The examination of the figures for individual 
parties confirms this pattern although it also shows that the average figures mask 
considerable cross-party variation, especially for the expert survey where 17 out 
of the 48 A coefficients were under 0.7 indicating a high degree of disagreement. 
For the Delphi, only two A were under 0.7 after the second round estimation. 
Both of these were about the placement of the Democraten ‘66 (D66) party on 
the two statements about the economy. Most likely, this difficulty in agreeing 
about the position in these statements, even after the iteration with feedback, can 
be attributed to the well-established centrist position of D66 in economic issues 
that can be a source of conflicting messages in its manifesto. In general, the 
results point to the efficiency of the Delphi method in terms of achieving 
consensus among experts in comparison to the conventional expert survey. 
 
Of course, reliability, measured in terms of perceptual agreement among experts, 
may not necessarily lead to valid estimates, as reliability is generally considered 
to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for validity (Krippendorff 2004: 
212-213). Unfortunately, when party positions are concerned, we lack the ‘gold 
standard’ benchmark against which estimates from various methods can be 
compared. This is why the attempts to validate party positions usually involve 
comparisons among different, yet imperfect, methods, and discussions as to 
which method positions parties according to well-established intuitions (e.g. 
Dinas and Gemenis 2010; Krouwel 2012; Marks et al. 2007). We follow a 
similar approach. We refrain from summarizing the relationship between 
different methods using statistical measures of association because the nature of 
the party placements in VAAs cannot be represented accurately through non-
parametric measures of association based on rank order.9 In Table X.2 we 
compare the placements of the eight parties on each of the six issues across the 
                                                          
9 More specifically, Spearman’s  and Kendall’s a cannot handle the ties in the dataset (two parties 
placed in the same position). Kendall's b can handle ties by using a divisor term, but like the 
aforementioned measures assumes rank ordered data. VAA party position data are not rankings but 
continuous variables that are observed as ordinal measures through a process of discretisation (e.g. 
experts assigning parties to the ‘agree’, ‘disagree’, etc categories). Pearson’s polychoric correlation 
coefficient  is not based on rank order and has attractive properties for VAA data as it assumes a 
continuous latent variable behind the ordered ratings. Its estimation, however, assumes bivariate 
normality that is clearly not satisfied by the skewed nature of the VAA party position data. Moreover, 
the use of correlation coefficients overestimates the degree of concordance between methods of party 
positioning in the presence of systematic error (Gemenis 2012b: 600-601). Consider the following 
example: ‘Method A’ places parties A=1, B=2, C=3 and ‘Method B’ A=3, B=4, C=5 respectively. In 
this case Spearman’s , Kendall’s b and Pearson’s  all equal 1 indicating a perfect correlation, as 
the rank ordering of the parties remains the same. However, the correlations disregard the systematic 
difference between the two methods. While ‘Method A’ places party B as ‘disagree’, ‘Method B’ 
places it as ‘agree’. Lin’s concordance correlation coefficient c accounts for the presence of 
systematic error by using a bias correction factor, but assumes continuous data. 
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four methods. As evident from this table, the four methods generally agree on 
most placements but there are many disagreements as well. We discuss some of 
them below with reference to what parties argue in their 2012 election 
manifestos. 
 
First of all, in line with previous research, agreement appears to be highest for 
issues that were salient in the campaign, and disagreement appears to be highest 
for centrist parties, and for parties that do not ‘own’ an issue, while party size 
seems to matter less. For example, while the economic crisis was the major issue 
in the 2012 election campaign, two issues that received quite some media 
attention were the proposal by the radical right Party for Freedom (PVV) to pull 
out of the Euro and return to the guilder (statement 5) and the discussion about 
whether or not registars should be allowed to refuse to marry same-sex couples if 
they had moral objections to do so (statement 3). On these two issues, all 
methods differentiate clearly between parties for and against: in the case of the 
Euro, only PVV was against remaining in the Eurozone, all other parties were in 
favour; and in the case of gay marriage, only the Christian-democratic (CDA and 
CU) parties were in favour of allowing registars to refuse to marry same-sex 
couples, with all other parties against. In the case of the PVV, the consensus 
among all the methods can be attributed to its ownership of the Euro issue. 
Another example of the effect of issue ownership on the clarity of party 
positioning is the position of D66 on automatic organ donation, a proposal put 
forward by D66 (statement 4). 
 
Moreover, disagreement between methods appears to be higher for CU and 
CDA, and to a lesser extent the radical left Socialist Party (SP) and D66, on 
issues on which these parties have either a centrist or unclear position. For 
example, on the issues of increasing tax rates for high incomes, and state 
involvement in the economy (statements 1 and 2), CU gets positioned by the 
different methods on ‘disagree’, ‘agree’ as well as ‘neither agree nor disagree’. 
Closer scrutiny of the manifesto shows that CU takes a rather centrist position on 
these issues, stating for example that taxes should be proportional to incomes, 
without directly proposing that taxes for higher incomes should be increased.10 
As another example, on the issue of organ donation CDA gets four different 
positions from the different methods, being positioned from ‘completely 
disagree’ to ‘agree’. In fact, the manifesto states that CDA wishes to further 
stimulate organ donation, however there is no mention of an automatic 
registration system.11 Moreover, in the run up to the election this was one of the 
issues of contention at the party members’ congress, and hence it is not 
surprising that there was disagreement among the different methods, given its 
unclear position. 
                                                          
10 CU election manifesto, Voor de verandering: 7, Christelijk-sociale hervormingen. 
Verkiezingsprogramma 2013-2017, 57. 
11 CDA election manifesto, Iedereen, verkiezingsprogramma 2012-2017, 55. 
Table X.2: Party positions in the selected statements. 
 Completely disagree  Disagree Neither agree, 
nor disagree 
Agree Completely agree 
1. Tax rates for the highest incomes should be increased. 
Self-placement VVD CDA, PVV, CU, D66  PvdA SP, GL 
Kieskompas VVD, PVV CDA, CU, D66   SP, PvdA, GL 
Expert survey VVD CDA, D66 PVV, CU PvdA, GL SP 
Delphi method VVD CDA, PVV, D66  CU SP, PvdA, GL 
2. The government should intervene more in the economy. 
Self-placement VVD PVV, CU, D66 CDA PvdA, GL, SP  
Kieskompas VVD, PVV CDA, CU, D66  PvdA, GL SP 
Expert survey  VVD, PVV, CDA, D66 CU PvdA, GL SP 
Delphi method VVD PVV CDA, D66 PvdA, GL, CU SP 
3. Registrars should be allowed to refuse to marry gay couples. 
Self-placement VVD, PvdA, D66, GL PVV, SP  CDA, CU  
Kieskompas VVD, PVV, PvdA, D66, GL, SP   CDA CU 
Expert survey PVV, D66, GL VVD, PvdA, SP  CDA CU 
Delphi method VVD, PVV, PvdA, D66, GL, SP    CU, CDA 
4. All adults are automatically registered as organ donors, unless they have explicitly declared otherwise. 
Self-placement  VVD, PVV, CU  CDA, SP, GL PvdA, D66 
Kieskompas PVV VVD, CDA, CU   PvdA, D66, GL, SP 
Expert survey CDA, CU VVD, PVV SP PvdA, GL D66 
Delphi method VVD, CU PVV CDA  PvdA, D66, GL, SP 
5. The Netherlands should stay part of the Euro. 
Self-placement PVV   VVD, CU, SP CDA, PvdA, D66, GL 
Kieskompas PVV CU  VVD, SP CDA, PvdA, D66, GL 
Expert survey PVV   VVD, CU, SP CDA, PvdA, D66, GL 
Delphi method PVV  CU SP CDA, PvdA, D66, GL, VVD 
6. Wearing a burqa should be prohibited. 
Self-placement  PvdA, D66, GL, CU, SP   VVD, PVV, CDA 
Kieskompas  PvdA, D66, GL, CU, SP   VVD, PVV, CDA 
Expert survey D66, GL PvdA, SP CDA, CU VVD PVV 
Delphi method D66, GL PvdA SP CDA, CU VVD, PVV 
Now, while there is generally rather high agreement between the different 
methods, some differences do appear. As regards the self-placement of parties, 
parties appear to position themselves generally in accordance with other 
methods. However, there are several occasions where parties place themselves 
slightly less extreme than the other methods, which might indicate strategic 
behaviour to appeal more easily to the median voter. There is only one case in 
which a party places itself opposite to other codings, i.e. the CDA in the case of 
organ donation. Turning to Kieskompas, this method appears to use more 
dispersed party placements, and, more importantly, never uses the middle-
category of ‘neither agree nor disagree’. Arguably however, in some cases 
parties do take a centrist position, such as the position of the CU on the issues 
mentioned above. The expert surveys seem to have the reverse tendency to 
Kieskompas, i.e. to position parties more often on a centrist position or on less 
extreme positions. Also, on some issue positions experts may have been using 
ideological dimensions of party competition as a heuristic short-cut to position 
parties, rather than using information from the party manifesto. A clear example 
of the latter is the issue of the CDA organ donation, where the position of the 
party was at best unclear, while experts nevertheless placed the party on 
‘completely disagree’. It seems likely that experts did not actually know the 
party’s position on this issue, but used its conservative position on the liberal-
conservative dimension as a cue. Finally, the Delphi method appears to be 
placing parties in more dispersed positions than party self-placements or the 
expert survey, and yet uses the middle position more often than Kieskompas. 
Contrary to the other three methods, the Delphi method allows us to check why 
parties were positioned in a centrist position, or other positions. Moreover, 
experts can use more sources than just the party manifesto, which greatly helps 
to clarify potential party shifts in position during an electoral campaign.  
 
For instance, in the case of the CDA’s position on automatic organ donation the 
CDA manifesto was unclear about the party’s position while its formed position 
as stated on the party website had been removed during the campaign. The 
panelists indicated (always referring to verifiable sources) that there had been a 
debate at the party members’ congress, as the result of which the party eventually 
adopted the position to accept a system of automatic donor registration that 
would however, give citizens many more chances to opt out than the system 
originally proposed by D66. This example hints at the efficacy of the Delphi 
method in estimating parties’ positions under uncertainty. 
 
As discussed, a general pattern that emerges from Table X.2 is that some 
methods tend to give a more polarized picture of party placements. Since looking 
directly at 192 (6x8x4) placements makes it difficult to assess this pattern, we 
summarize the degree of polarization by using the (1-A)/2 formula, where A is 
van der Eijk’s (2001) coefficient of agreement calculated among the placements 
of the eight parties on each of the statements. As evident in Table X.3, the expert 
survey (followed by party self-placement) is the method that gives a more 
centripetal picture of Dutch party positions on every statement with the 
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exception of the statement about the Euro where the Delphi method gives a 
slightly more centripetal picture due to the centrist placement of CU. The 
Kieskompas and the Delphi methods clearly give the most polarized picture 
compared to the other two methods. Although we have no benchmark to assess 
which scenario is the more plausible, we nevertheless contend that, for the expert 
survey, the observed centripetal tendency is related to the uncertainty associated 
with the estimates. When faced with uncertainty, respondents tend to pick the 
middle responses as a ‘safe’ value or as a proxy for ‘I don’t know’ (see Baka et 
al. 2012). Alternatively, respondents might pick a less centrist response, but 
under uncertainty these will cancel each other out and bring the median estimate 
to the centre of the scale (see Tilley and Wlezien 2008). In the case of self-
placement by parties, polarization is somewhat more pronounced. Here, centrist 
placements are less likely to be associated with uncertainty and either the result 
of a true centrist position, or the product of a strategy intended to give a position 
that would look appealing to the median voter. For these reasons we contend that 
the polarized picture presented by the Kieskompas and Delphi methods is likely 
to be more plausible. 
 







1. Taxes 0.46 0.66 0.41 0.64 
2. State/economy 0.4 0.45 0.29 0.35 
3. Gay couples 0.34 0.24 0.35 0.5 
4. Organ donors 0.44 0.6 0.48 0.51 
5. Euro 0.3 0.32 0.3 0.26 
6. Burqa 0.53 0.53 0.41 0.55 
Mean 0.41 0.46 0.37 0.47 
5 Conclusions 
We draw several conclusions from the comparison of the four methods in 
estimating party positions in VAAs. Firstly, we consider that the party self-
placement method is impractical in many contexts since party response rates tend 
to be low. Nevertheless, even when parties do respond to VAA questionnaires, as 
is the case for the Dutch parties, strategic manipulation remains as a possibility.  
 
Our empirical analysis noted the tendency of this method to portray parties as 
centrist, at least more so than alternatives such as the Kieskompas method. The 
degree to which these centrist positions can be attributed to strategic placement is 
not directly verifiable, yet we note that parties have been shown to be able to 
manipulate the direction of voting recommendations in VAAs by taking carefully 
calculated combinations of extreme positions (see Ramonaitė 2010). Our 
conclusion is that VAAs should not uncritically rely on party self-placements. 
Expert surveys transfer the responsibility of party positioning from parties to 
political scientists. Nevertheless, expert survey estimates of party positions 
exhibit much uncertainty. Although the average picture is one of modest to 
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considerable agreement among the experts, prompting researchers to 
unequivocally label expert surveys as ‘reliable’ (Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen 
and Marks 2007), a closer examination reveals that agreement varies 
considerably from issue to issue. Disagreement often leads to centrist estimates, 
and our comparison to the remaining three methods showed that such estimates 
may be invalid. Our conclusion is that expert surveys cannot reliably estimate the 
positions of all parties on all statements in a VAA. The Kieskompas method 
promises to counter the weaknesses of the aforementioned methods by 
combining their strengths. Our comparison showed that this promise is generally 
satisfied although two concerns remain. To begin with, the method still requires 
parties’ full cooperation. If parties respond, the aggregation of responses can be 
structured on the party/team interaction. In cases where parties do not cooperate, 
however, the estimation on the team side becomes somewhat of a black box. 
Although there is evidence that team members often disagree with each other as 
to how parties should be placed, the process of fostering consensus via 
unstructured team discussions cannot be validated empirically through 
replication (see Krippendorff 2004: 217-219) so claims that ‘inter-coder 
reliability was maximized’ (Trechsel and Mair 2011: 13) should be viewed with 
much caution.  
 
The Delphi method aims to overcome these concerns associated with the 
Kieskompas method. Consistent with previous research (Gemenis 2012b), our 
application of the Delphi method to the case of the Dutch parties showed that the 
anonymous iteration with feedback over two rounds increased the consensus 
among experts to levels considerably higher than those observed in a 
conventional expert survey. Moreover, our comparison showed that this 
consensus gave rather plausible estimates of party positions even in several 
‘difficult’ cases. The problems in applying this approach in the VAA context are 
largely practical. The first regards cost. For employing seven panelists to 
estimate the positions in an eight parties party system on 30 statements as in a 
typical VAA, the estimated cost for remunerating the panelists is about 4,000 
euro. Of course, this could be reduced considerably if some of the panelists are 
members of the design team. We contend that this is not a prohibitive cost given 
that some VAAs receive generous government funding, while others receive 
media sponsorships. The second problem is of a technical nature. The only easily 
accessible on-line platform for Delphi estimation is dated and often exhibits 
technical problems. The Preference Matcher consortium is nevertheless in the 
process of providing a specialized platform for Delphi estimation that is 
specifically designed for coding party positions in the VAA context, and a beta 
version of this platform has been used successfully during the design of 
Choose4Cyrpus. With these issues practically solved, the next goal is to test the 
accuracy of the Delphi method in randomized experiments for determining, a) 
the optimal type of feedback (median position and/or justifications versus simple 
iteration), and b) the optimal composition of the panel in terms of size and 
expertise. Although such questions have been rigorously tested in other contexts 
(see Rowe and Wright 1999; Rowe et al. 2005), it is necessary to examine them 
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in the VAA/party positions context. With such issues addressed, we will be in 
possession of a method that is practical, as well as capable of producing reliable 
and valid estimates of parties’ policy positions. 
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Appendix 
Panelists: Loes Aaldering, Klaas Derks, Mark Hessels, Rens Hogeling, Elmar Jansen, Joyce Kuipers, Paul Lucardie, Jannine van de 
Maat, Daphne Van der Pas, Martin Rosema, Mariken Van der Velden, Cynthia Van Vonno, Annemarie Walter, Marc Van der Wardt. 
Table X.4: Assignment of Delphi panellists to parties. 
Panellist PVV  CDA D66 VVD GL PvdA SP CU 
Faculty member 1 X X   X X   
Faculty member 2  X X   X X  
Faculty member 3   X X   X X 
Faculty member 4 X   X X   X 
PhD researcher 1 X   X X   X 
PhD researcher 2 X X   X X   
PhD researcher 3  X X   X X  
PhD researcher 4   X X   X X 
Master student/graduate 1 X  X  X  X  
Master student/graduate 2  X  X  X  X 
Master student/graduate 3 X  X  X  X  
Master student/graduate 4  X  X  X  X 
Master student/graduate 5 X  X  X  X  
Master student/graduate 6  X  X  X  X 
 
